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1. INTRODUCTION 
Investment decisions are challenging due to high costs and time required to 
analyse projects. As a result, rating announcements are treated as signals which stem 
from informational asymmetry existing between debt issuers and investors. Therefore, 
credit ratings are decisive to market agents during their decision process. For example, 
institutional investors distinguish between investment and non-investment grade ratings 
as it is essential when considering investment portfolios. Financial intermediaries use 
credit ratings to set lending interest rates and to control the level of required capital. 
Hence, the ratings made by credit agencies have significant impact on the rating issuers.  
However, do changes in credit ratings convey important information to the 
market? In this paper we attempt to answer this question. To do this we examine ratings 
for informational content in the German market during the recent financial crisis. 
Specifically, we investigate the price impact of upgrades and downgrades made by 
three agencies – Moody’s Investors Service, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings. The 
data are daily stock prices of companies listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. It is 
divided into two periods: pre-crisis (2002-2007) and post-crisis (2009-2015). We 
intentionally exclude 2008 because there was a decline in the global stock market with 
capital injections and government bailouts which could contaminate our data.  
The decision on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange is based on liquidity and intensity 
of trading. It is a large stock exchange with high turnover velocity in its premium 
segments. Thus, it fits our required criteria. There are previous research focusing on 
German market, for example on stock performance after inclusion in Dow Jones 
sustainability index (Oberndorfer et al, 2013), short-term stock overreaction, (Lobe and 
Rieks, 2011) and credit ratings as a measure of innovation (Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2004). 
However, to the best of our knowledge there is no research on HDAX stocks reaction to 
rating upgrades and downgrades. Studies investigating rating changes concentrate either 
on stocks of financial industries or banks, or in case of Dichev and Piotroski (2001) on 
the US bond market.  
To calculate the impact of rating announcements on stock returns we use the 
event study methodology. We define an event date as a public announcement of rating 
change by rating agencies and examining an event window. In this paper the event 
window starts 60 business days prior a rating announcement and ends 20 business days 
after the announcement. Decision on 60 pre-event days is based on the fact that rating 
agencies usually act upon material information and announce an actual downgrade 
following a negative review within three months. We use paired samples test for 
significance of the mean difference between cumulative abnormal returns and 
cumulative normal returns. Hence, rating changes convey important information if the 
event dates indicate significant market reaction. 
The remainder of the paper organized as follows. Literature review is given in 
section 2. Section 3 presents methodology employed in the paper. In section 4 we 
present data description and sampling procedures. Empirical findings are given in 
Section 5. The final section concludes 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Rating agencies have a privileged access to confidential information. Companies 
are reluctant to reveal private information to the public, even positive ones (e.g. R&D 
projects), to prevent competitors from obtaining sensitive information. However, they 
share confidential information with rating analysts who incorporate it into the rating 
assessments. By doing so, companies indirectly communicate important information 
through credit rating to the market participants. Additionally, according to Calvo and 
Mendoza (2000), high costs of generating new information make market agents rely on 
rating agencies. Therefore, they function as intermediaries that reduce informational 
asymmetry.  
However, Gropp and Richards (2001) argue that rating agencies lack in 
timeliness. They simply reflect the information that is already known to the market. In 
addition, there is a potential conflict of interest and they may act in the interest of the 
issuers. The rating agencies are also blamed for pro-cyclical behaviour (see e.g. 
Schumacher, 2014). For example, the agencies failed to spot several corporate defaults, 
such as e.g. Enron and Worldcom, downgrading only after their defaults. More recently, 
they are singled out for the recent financial crisis, due to inability to foresee subprime 
mortgage securities defaults. All three rating agencies – Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s 
and Fitch graded these securities as safe (see for example White, 2010).  
Nonetheless, the agencies justify their sluggishness by consistency of the rating 
grades and that they cannot be changed just because of short-term fluctuations. (see also 
Gibson et al (2015, p.3) for another reason of such sluggishness). It is intended to 
reflect fundamental position of the issuers’ creditworthiness, which only partially 
depends on the temporary fluctuations. Because of “rating stickiness” and lack of 
capacity to provide early warning of risks, the agencies have introduced rating reviews. 
While the rating changes (upgrade and downgrade) represent fundamental change of an 
issuer’s financial stability, the reviews indicate that current short-term events may affect 
ratings in the long-run. By avoiding frequent rating changes the agencies trade-off 
between accuracy and stability of rating grades. 
2.1 Price pressure hypothesis and behavioural aspect of rating announcements 
Many empirical studies investigate the impact of credit ratings on stocks. The 
early studies include Pinches and Singleton (1978), Griffin and Sanvicente (1982), 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), and Glascock, et al (1987). They find mixed evidence 
of the effect of rating changes. For example, Pinches and Singleton (1978), report that 
rating changes are anticipated by market participants; and there is no abnormal reaction 
following an announcement. In contrast, Griffin and Sanvicente (1982), using the same 
approach show no rating anticipation; whilst Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) and 
Glascock et al (1987) report negative reaction for downgrades. 
Interestingly, Goh and Ederington (1993) and Richards and Deddouche (1999)  
find that ‘stock prices either do not respond to rating changes or respond in the opposite 
direction to what would be expected if announcements conveyed value-relevant 
information’ (ibid, p.1). Therefore, downgrades can be good news if associated with an 
increase in leverage of companies. It shifts wealth from bondholders to shareholders 
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which have positive effect on shares. Whereas downgrades associated with 
deteriorating firm prospects result in negative effect on stocks. 
Several studies find asymmetric responses to positive and negative rating events. 
For example, Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) examining daily abnormal returns as a 
reaction to Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s rating changes, find significant negative 
returns after downgrades and no abnormal performance for upgrades. Results by Hand 
et al. (1992) confirm such asymmetric reaction to rating changes. Similarly, Dichev and 
Piotroski (2001) find no abnormal return following upgrades. They also find substantial 
negative abnormal returns after downgrades following Moody’s bond rating changes 
during 1970 to 1997. They explain that downgrades are regarded by the market 
participants as “strong predictors of future deteriorations in earnings”, whereas it is not 
the case for upgrades.  
According to Norden and Weber (2004), the information-processing biases can 
also contribute to this phenomenon. This idea is supported by Ederington and Goh 
(1998) who argue that companies voluntarily release good news but reluctant to release 
negative information. This leads to bias towards negative information content of ratings 
and creates significant abnormal returns in the case of downgrades (but not for 
upgrades). Furthermore, Jorion and Zhang (2007) suggest that the agencies allocate 
more resources to identify problems in credit quality of the issuers due to the “higher 
reputational cost of failing to detect looming credit problems.” This again implies 
smaller information contained in rating upgrades compared to downgrades.  
In addition, there is a price pressure due to changes in rating grade, indirectly 
imposed by financial regulatory authorities. To be more precise, institutional investors 
such as insurance companies, pension and mutual funds are restricted from holding 
assets below investment rating grade (see for example Trusted Sources, 2011). The 
threshold of investment-grade debt, below which investments are often labelled 
speculative, corresponds to a rating of Baa3 from Moody’s and BBB – from S&P and 
Fitch. And each negative rating event which brings the issuer closer to the investment 
threshold will trigger risk of selling its securities by institutional investors. Taking into 
account that these institutions keep large amount of capital in debt securities, shift of 
these securities put a downward pressure on issuers’ stock prices.  
Several studies have found support for the price pressure hypothesis. Steiner and 
Heinke (2001) find that downgrades from investment grade to speculative grade elicit a 
larger widening of credit spreads. Hand et al. (1992) find that the reaction of 
investment-grade bonds to rating downgrades is larger than that of speculative-grade 
bonds. On the other hand, Jorion and Zhang (2007) show that the effect of investment 
grade threshold is overstated. They introduce a prior rating into their model following 
which the investment grade effect disappeared. 
However, Kliger and Sarig (2000) suggest that the impact of rating 
announcements is greater for firms with high leverage (which are typically rated 
speculative grade) than for firms with low leverage (which are typically rated 
investment grade). Explanation for this effect might be in payment conditions of many 
financial contracts which are used to be linked to credit ratings (Micu et al. 2006). Such 
contracts specify that a rating downgrade empowers creditors to demand immediate 
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repayment of debt which in turn can negatively influence the debtor’s financial stability 
and put downward pressure on share prices. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
For this research we employ event study methodology. This methodology 
investigates the impact of news on stock prices. Depending on the type of information, 
announcements increase or decrease the value of stocks on the market. Quintessentially, 
it involves estimating the direction and size of the abnormal return attributable to 
unanticipated information, see further Pham (2015), Chi and Tang (2008), Hall and 
Kenjegaliev (2009), Campbell et al (1997), McWilliams and Siegel (1997), Corrado and 
Zivney (1992), Corrado (1989), Ball and Tourus (1988), Brown and Warner (1980, 
1985) and Dyckman et al (1984). In this paper an event date is upgrade or downgrade 
announcement made by three rating agencies.  
3.1 Cumulative abnormal return 
The event window in the paper is subdivided into four time intervals: 60 to 21 
business days before a rating announcement [-60,-21]; 20 to one day before the 
announcement [-20,-1]; a day of the announcement and the following day [0,+1]; and 2 
to 20 days after the announcement [+2,+20] (see Figure 1). If the rating announcement 
is fully anticipated, then equity prices should adjust prior to the announcement, in either 
[-60,-21] or [-20,-1] intervals.  
Figure 1 Event window 
 
 
 
 
In case if a rating announcement has informational value and results in a price 
pressure, then it should have price impact in [0,+1] interval. For example, Micu et al. 
(2006) state that this two-day interval should be applied because the announcement 
might have been made after markets closed for the day. Additionally, the price 
adjustment can also be delayed and its impact might be evident during [+2,+20] 
interval.  
Stock price reaction is a significant change in a stock return over the analysed 
period. To identify if these changes are caused by general upward (or downward) trend 
in the market or credit rating announcements we, firstly, calculated the abnormal return. 
-60,-21 -20,-1 +1,+20 -1, +1 
T 
Pre-event 
period 
Post-event 
period 
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It is the difference between the realized return on the security and expected return, see 
equation 1:  
ˆ( )kt kt tAR R R   (1) 
where 
ktAR  – abnormal return (residual) for security k  at time t; 
ktR  – actual daily return for security k at time t; 
ˆ
tR  – expected/normal return at time t. 
The actual daily return is the ratio of the closing stock price tP at day t to the 
preceding day’s closing stock price minus 1 (equation 2): 
1
1tkt
t
P
R
P
   (2) 
In the next step we obtain a normal return ˆtR  for each day, within the event period of 
each rating change announcement. Normally, it should represent the return which 
would have been expected if no event took place within the event window. Usually its 
computation involves economic model (e.g CAPM) and based on the stock prices 
preceding the event window. However, rating changes reflect the current financial 
conditions of the credit issuer. Therefore, estimates of the model for expected returns 
based on the past observations do not reflect expected returns within the event period. 
On the other hand, market index can be used to proxy expected return during the event 
window (see for example Brown and Warner, 1985). Considering that this study 
examines the data on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, we assume that the expected return 
is the return on the market index HDAX. Hence, HDAX index can be seen as a normal 
return against which you set actual returns.  
Once the abnormal stock returns for all securities are calculated, the residuals 
are averaged across the firms to produce the average residual for each day (equation 3). 
Such averaging help to cancel out the “noise” in the stock returns across the firms. 
kt
t
AR
AAR
L

  (3) 
where 
tAAR – average residual across all the firms in the sample for day t; 
tAR  – abnormal return (residual) for security k  at time t; 
L – number of rating announcements in the sample 
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Following that, abnormal returns are summed up over the analysed period. Thus 
a cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) can be shown as 



T
t
tt AARCAAR
1
 (4) 
where T – number of days over which AARt is accumulated 
This equation reflects the average total effect of the rating announcements 
across all firms over the examined period. It captures a multi-day period which helps to 
identify the price changes that absorb the new information if rating changes have an 
anticipated nature. In a similar spirit, we compute cumulative average normal returns 
(CANR). After calculating CAAR and CANR we test the mean difference for 
significance.  
3.2 Paired samples test 
To test for significance of abnormal returns we conduct a paired sample test. 
This procedure consists in testing whether the mean of cumulative abnormal returns is 
significantly different from the mean of cumulative normal returns. It is employed for 
each interval of the event window, both for upgrades and downgrades. Hays (1973) 
note that the paired samples test can be applied when each variable is nominally 
independent of each other but both variables have distinct dependent score, while the 
scores are not necessarily independent.  
If two variables matched in pairs the difference between the means is an 
unbiased estimate of the population difference: 
(M )CAAR CANR CAAR CANRj j j jE M      (5) 
Where M ,CAAR CANRj jM  are means of cumulative average abnormal returns and 
cumulative average normal returns, respectively, with the sub-event window j , where 
[ 60, 21], [ 20, 1], [0, 1] and [ 2, 20]j          and (M )CAAR CAARj jE   and 
( )CANR CANRj jE M  . 
At the same time such pairing changes the standard error of the difference. The 
variance of the sample means can be expressed as  
2(M )diff CAAR CANR CAAR CANRj j j j jE M       (6) 
And it is identical to  
 
2
(M ) ( )diff CAAR CAAR CANR CANRj j j j jE M         (7) 
Therefore, after rearrangement of Eq. (7) we get 
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2 2(M ) ( ) 2 (M )( )diff CAAR CAAR CANR CANR CAAR CAAR CANR CANRj j j j j j j j jE E M E M            
(8) 
The first term in Eq. (8) is simply 
2
MCAARj
  and the second is CANR
2
M j
  while the 
third term is (M , )CAAR CANRj jCov M , i.e. covariance of the means. In case if two variables 
are independent then (M , ) 0CAAR CANRj jCov M  . However, in our case they are not and 
the expectation is not ordinarily zero. Hence, 
 
CANR
2 2
M M
2 (M , )CAAR
j j
diff CAAR CANR
j j jCov M      (9) 
Hays (1973) argue that instead of cumbersome computation of  
(M , )CAAR CANRj jCov M  you can think of the data as one sample of pairs and each pair j ,  
[ 60, 21], [ 20, 1], [0, 1] and [ 2, 20]j         , is associated with a difference in  
 
t, t,( )
CAAR CANR
j j jD y y   (10) 
Where 
t, ,j CAARy  is an observation at time t  in the paired sample j  in CAAR  and 
t, ,j CANRy  is an observation at time t  in the sample j  in CANR . In this case we can use 
an ordinary test statistics for a single mean employing the scores 
jD . That is 
 
t,
j
j
t
D
j
D
M
N


 (11) 
Where 
jN  is a number of observations in each sub-sample ,j
[ 60, 21], [ 20, 1], [0, 1] and [ 2, 20]j         . 
And  
2
2
(M )
1 1
j
j
tj
j Dt
D
j j
D
N
s
N N
 
 

 (12) 
Then the paired samples test statistic can be found by 
 
1
( )
j jj
j
D DN
j
D
j
M E M
s
N


   
(13) 
With 1jN   degrees of freedom in the paired sub-sample ,j   
[ 60, 21], [ 20, 1], [0, 1] and [ 2, 20]j         . 
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The hypothesis is about the true value of ( ) 0
j j
CAAR CANR
D D j jE M        and 
hence you can test hypothesis about a difference provided that the observation in each 
sub-samples are matched pairwise. In a similar spirit you can find confidence intervals 
employing DM  and  
Ds
N
. If we cannot reject the null it will suggest that mean of the 
differences between abnormal returns and normal returns is not significant, which in 
turn implies rating changes carry scant informational value for investors and vice versa 
for alternative hypotheses. Table 3 shows summary of hypotheses raised in the paper.    
Table 1. The summary of hypotheses  
 
0 : 0jDH    Rating changes do not carry informational content 
  Informational content hypotheses 
: 0
ja D
H    
Rating changes do carry informational content.  
(this is parsimonious hypothesis since the market could react 
opposite of what you expect after upgrade or downgrade) 
 
 
4. DATA AND SAMPLING PROCEDURES 
The focus of the research is the constituents of HDAX index. Daily stock prices 
are extracted from Thomson DataStream for two periods: period one - from 
Jan./01/2002 to Sept./01/2007 and period two - from Jan./01/2009 to May/01/2015. The 
rating change announcements are retrieved from Bloomberg global database. The event 
dates are selected based on the announcements relating to the senior unsecured debt 
credit rating or long-term issuer credit rating. This type of credit ratings is chosen 
because they tend to reflect the major changes in a company’s performance or in 
economic environment that might affect the issuer in the long run. As practice shows, 
such changes are most likely to bring up a reaction of both strategic and portfolio 
investors who hold securities or contemplating the purchase of securities. 
Each firm are rated by 1.93 and 2.40 agencies on average, for the first and the 
second periods respectively. It is likely that a trigger event may initiate a simultaneous 
reaction of two or all three rating agencies. Thus, we remove some announcements 
from the analysis whenever the sum of rating changes for a particular issuer in a 10-day 
window interval around a rating announcement is greater than one. We do this to 
control for other events that might have an impact on stock prices around the day of the 
announcement (additionally some of the events are eliminated due to data availability). 
The total number of rating announcements in the final samples equals to 131 (36 
issuers) and 93 (36 issuers), respectively. The sample sizes in this research are in line 
with those reported in the literature. Glascock et al (1987), for example, examined 162 
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rating changes; in Followill and Martel (1997) the estimation is performed with 64 
rating announcements. The selection process and final result of data sampling are 
available from the authors. Table 2 provides information on the samples breakdown for 
upgrades and downgrades announced by each of the three rating agencies. Negative 
announcements of all rating announcements in the final samples account for 54% for 
the first period and 52% for the second period; the majority of rating changes is made 
by Standard & Poor’s.  
Table 2 Number of announcements with rating changes 
 
Period before financial crisis 
(01.01.2002-01.09.2007) 
 
Period after financial crisis 
(01.01.2009-01.05.2015) 
 
 
Upgrades Downgrades Total Upgrades Downgrades Total 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Raw sample 
Fitch Ratings 19 22 41 21 25 46 
Moody's Investors 
Service 
21 21 42 23 34 57 
Standard & Poor's 38 40 78 53 39 92 
Total 
78 83 161 97 98 195 
48% 52% 
 
50% 50%  
  Final sample 
Fitch Ratings 14 20 34 9 8 17 
Moody's Investors 
Service 
17 17 34 13 20 33 
Standard & Poor's 29 34 63 23 20 43 
Total 
60 71 131 45 48 93 
46% 54% 
 
48% 52%  
Source: Bloomberg, authors’ calculations 
 
5. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
 
This section presents empirical results of our research. Figures 2, 3 and 4, 5 
show the movement of the average abnormal returns (AAR) observed around rating 
upgrades and downgrades. Figures 6 and 7 reflect behaviour of the cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAAR). Details of statistical properties and results of testing 
procedures are given in tables 3 and 4 (for rating upgrades) and in tables 5 and 6 (for 
rating downgrades). AAR is computed using Eq. 3, CAAR - Eq. 4 and 
1N
j
  - Eq. 13. 
Figures 2 and 3 cover period from 2002 to 2007 and show that the abnormal 
stock returns have a chaotic behaviour within the event window. They oscillate between 
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0.7 and -0.5 during rating upgrades and between -0.5 and 0.5 during rating downgrades 
(Figure 2 also shows a reduction in AR after the event date). Similar picture can be 
observed from figures 4 and 5 for the period from 2009 to 2015. Variability ranges from 
0.8 and -0.5 for upgrades and slightly higher for downgrades during post-crisis period: 
0.9 and -1.2. The prevailing number of returns has a positive sign for rating upgrades 
and the majority of returns for downgrades have a negative sign.  
The estimated CAAR is plotted in figures 6 and 7. According to these figures, 
positive rating changes lead to increase in CAAR, and vice versa for negative rating 
changes. They also show that price adjustment occurs gradually long before the rating 
announcement: starting around day -30 for rating upgrades and earlier for rating 
downgrades – around day -58. During the event, most of the abnormal returns 
statistically insignificant while post-announcement periods show return reversal. One 
exception is rating upgrade for 2009 - 2015 period. Here you can see that event period 
is statistically significant. At the same time, there is no return reversal although CAAR 
slightly decreases after day 15. Results of the testing procedures are given below. 
  
© 2017. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
12 
 
Figure 2 Average abnormal returns around rating upgrades  
Period before financial crisis (01.01.2002-01.09.2007) 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Average abnormal returns around rating downgrades 
Period before financial crisis (01.01.2002-01.09.2007) 
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Figure 4 Average abnormal returns around rating upgrades 
Period after financial crisis (01.01.2009-01.05.2015) 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Average abnormal returns around rating downgrades 
Period after financial crisis (01.01.2009-01.05.2015) 
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5.1 Significance of CAAR for rating upgrades 
 
Tables 3 and 4 provide statistical properties of CAAR during rating upgrade. 
The event window is broken into four pairs: [ 60, 21], [ 20, 1], [0, 1]      and 
[ 2, 20]  . According to these tables, there is a market reaction to rating changes. 
Results in tables 3 and 4 give ground for not accepting 0H  at 1% level for three pairs 
out of four for both pre- and post-crisis periods, that is 
[ 60, 21]
0D    , [ 20, 1] 0D     and 
[ 2, 20]
0D    . The reaction starts approximately 58 days before the rating change 
announcement; the peak of price adjustment with more than 73% of all positive CAAR 
takes place within [ 20, 1]   time interval. Abnormal stock returns at this period reach 
1.86 and 3.2. 
 
As it can be observed from the tables, upgraded rating has a small positive 
abnormal return of about 0.20 and 0.33 units at the event date [0,+1]; paired samples 
tests are also insignificant during both periods (for the post-crisis data with a small 
margin). Thus, the hypothesis that 
[0, 1]0
: 0DH     cannot be rejected within 2-day 
period of the rating announcement which suggests that a discrepancy between CAAR
and CANR  is not substantial, that is 
[0, 1] [0, 1] [0, 1] [0, 1]
0CAAR CANRD DM          . In this respect, 
our results are  similar to those obtained by Dichev and Piotroski (2001), Holthausen 
and Leftwich (1986) and Hand et al (1992) who found no abnormal returns during and 
following the upgrades. 
 
These findings correspond with results obtained by Pinches and Singleton 
(1978), Goh and Ederington (1999), Partnoy (2001).  According to these authors rating 
changes are largely anticipated in a way that information leakage makes market 
participants become aware of all the important news regarding the issuer. Thus, market 
agents take appropriate actions long before any rating agency incorporates them into the 
upgraded rating assessments. If ever credit ratings carried any new positive information, 
previously unknown to the public, the market participants would have reacted on the 
date the rating change announced.  
 
This argues that the credit rating agencies have restricted ability to add 
information to the market by their modified assessment of obligors’ credit risk. To put it 
another way, the market, existing in semi-strong form of efficiency have access to all 
available information and absorbs it immediately as the news become public. However, 
we cannot rule out that in some instances it could be confidential, inside information 
which for various reasons become public. The rating agencies, in contrast, are sluggish 
to integrate this information in their rating assessments. 
 
The possible explanation is that the companies try to release good news to the 
public domain as soon as possible and, thus, induce an increase in share prices. In such 
a case it might be challenging for rating analysts to catch up with rapid spread of the 
information because the change in issuer’s credit rating must be preceded by an 
improvement in business or external factors on a proven sustainable basis. Plus, there is 
an administrative side for releasing the rating to the public domain. 
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Figure 4 shows a surprising downward movement of the CAAR for rating 
upgrade during a pre-crisis period. The CAAR made up -1.88 units within [+2, +20] 
days after the upgrade announcement and 
[ 2, 20]
.027DM      (table 3). It is negative, and 
according to 18[ 2, 20]  , significant and gives ground for not accepting [ 2, 20]0 : 0DH      at 
1% level. Other researchers also found a statistically significant return reversal 
following the announcement (e.g. Glascock et al, 1987). For the post-crisis period, pair 
4 is also significant albeit (as expected) it is positive,  
[ 2, 20]
.011DM     without sharp 
downward movement. 
 
Lastly on a rating upgrade, comparison between pre- and post crises periods, 
given in table 5, show that the mean difference of abnormal returns are significant 
during the first time interval, [ 60, 20]  ,  with 
[ 60, 20]
.013DM    . It is statistically 
significant at 1% level. Table 5 also shows that the next two pairs are not statistically 
significant; while pair 4 belonging to interval [ 2, 20]   is significant with
[ 2, 20]
.018DM    and 
18
[ 2, 20] 7.972   .  Observation of tables 3 and 4 shows that within 
the first and last pairs, 
jD
M ’s are higher in pre-crisis period than during post-crisis and 
the outcome of the test in table 5 indicates this.. 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics and paired samples t-test for cumulative average abnormal stock returns around rating upgrade announcements† 
Pre-crisis period (01.01.2002-01.09.2007) 
Paired Samples Test 
 
Paired Differences 
t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 Preannouncement period 1:   
Av Abnormal return - Av Normal 
return  
-.01955 .00972 .00154 -.02265 -.01644 -12.723** 39 .000 
Pair 2 Preannouncement period 2:  
Av Abnormal return - Av Normal 
return 
-.00549 .00404 .00090 -.00738 -.00360 -6.083** 19 .000 
Pair 3 Preannouncement period 3: 
 Av Abnormal return - Av 
Normal return  
-.00127 .00075 .00053 -.00801 .00547 -2.392 1 .252 
Pair 4 Preannouncement period 4: 
 Av Abnormal return - Av 
Normal return 
-.02697 .01071 .00246 -.03213 -.02180 -10.971** 18 .000 
† Preannouncement period 1: 40-day interval [-60; -21], Preannouncement period 2: 20-day interval [-20; -1], Preannouncement period 3: 2-day interval [0; +1], 
Preannouncement period 4: 19-day interval [+2; +20] 
Notes:    * indicates significance at 5% level,  
** indicates significance at 1% level 
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics and paired samples t-test for cumulative average abnormal stock returns around rating upgrade announcements † 
Post-crisis period (01.01.2009-01.05.2015) 
Paired Samples Test 
 
Paired Differences 
t df 
Sig.  
(2-tailed) Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 Preannouncement period 1:   
Av Abnormal return - Av Normal 
return  
-.00453 .00452 .00071 -.00598 -.00309 -6.338** 39 .000 
Pair 2 Preannouncement period 2:  
Av Abnormal return - Av Normal 
return 
.01194 .00783 .00175 .00828 .01561 6.824** 19 .000 
Pair 3 Preannouncement period 3: 
 Av Abnormal return - Av 
Normal return  
.00630 .00214 .00152 -.01296 .02557 4.156 1 .150 
Pair 4 Preannouncement period 4: 
 Av Abnormal return - Av 
Normal return 
.01067 .00460 .00106 .00845 .01289 10.092** 18 .000 
† Preannouncement period 1: 40-day interval [-60; -21], Preannouncement period 2: 20-day interval [-20; -1], Preannouncement period 3: 2-day interval [0; +1], 
Preannouncement period 4: 19-day interval [+2; +20] 
Notes:    * indicates significance at 5% level,  
** indicates significance at 1% level 
 
 
 
© 2017. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
18 
 
Table 5 Descriptive statistics and paired samples t-test for the difference between pre- and post-crisis periods for CAAR around rating upgrade 
announcements † 
Paired Samples Test 
 
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod1_pre - 
AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod1_post 
.0127599 .0060858 .0009622 .0108136 .0147062 13.261** 39 .000 
Pair 2 AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod2_pre - 
AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod2_post 
.0002173 .0062855 .0014055 -.0027245 .0031590 .155 19 .879 
Pair 3 AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod3_pre - 
AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod3_post 
-.0058816 .0022390 .0015832 -.0259985 .0142354 -3.715 1 .167 
Pair 4 AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod4_pre - 
AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod4_post 
.0183304 .0100232 .0022995 .0134994 .0231614 7.972** 18 .000 
† Preannouncement period 1: 40-day interval [-60; -21], Preannouncement period 2: 20-day interval [-20; -1], Preannouncement period 3: 2-day interval [0; +1], 
Preannouncement period 4: 19-day interval [+2; +20] 
Notes:    * indicates significance at 5% level,  
** indicates significance at 1% level  
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Figure 6 Cumulative average abnormal returns around rating upgrades and downgrades 
Pre-crisis period (01.01.2002-01.09.2007) 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Cumulative average abnormal returns around rating upgrades and downgrades 
Post-crisis period (01.01.2009-01.05.2015) 
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5.2 Significance of CAAR for rating downgrades 
 
Tables 6 and 7 give statistical properties of 
DM  for four pairs 
[ 60, 21], [ 20, 1], [0, 1]      and [ 2, 20]  and paired samples test, 1Nj
 , during 
rating downgrades. According to these tables, the strongest market reaction occurs 
within the pre-announcement window, inside [-60,-21] interval where CAAR equals to 
-3.03 and -5.3 for pre- and post-crisis periods respectively. This accounts for 
approximately 75% (pre-crisis) and 163% (for post-crisis) of total abnormal returns for 
the whole time interval. The mean differences for this pair are 
[ 60, 21]
.028DM     for the 
period between 2002-2009 and higher for the period between 2009-2015 where 
[ 60, 21]
.055DM     . Paired samples tests are statistically significant for both periods. One 
possibility is that the information affecting the rating downgrades had become publicly 
available during that period. Another explanation - rating agencies themselves could 
reveal their plans on possible change in the credit rating through previously announced 
negative rating reviews. 
 
In the next interval, [ 20, 1]j    , a rating change exert strong impact on the 
stock market during pre-crisis period. However, there is a weak influence of rating 
downgrade in post-crisis period. In the former case share prices are adjusting up until 
the event date. However, in the latter one it is relatively stable until the day -9 after 
which CAAR sharply falls, this can be observed in figure 7. The mean differences for 
each of the periods are 
[ 20, 1]
.015DM     and [ 20, 1] .001DM    , respectively. Percentage 
changes in CAARs within this event window are equalled to -1.06 and -0.10. The 
interval [ 20, 1]   during pre-crisis period shows statistical significance at 1% level, 
with 19[ 20, 1] 7.595   , while during post-crisis period it is not significant 
19
[ 20, 1] .209)(    . Thus, in case of 2002-2007 period, [ 20, 1]0 : 0DH      is not accepted for 
the window preceding the downgrade announcements and vice versa for 2009-2015 
period. The result of pre-crisis period for [ 20, 1]j     corresponds to findings by 
Jorion and Zhang (2007), Nordon and Weber (2004), Goh and Ederington (1999) and 
Hand et al (1992) in terms of the anticipated character of the rating downgrades.  
 
CAAR at the announcement date [0, +1] during pre-crisis period is -0.48. It is 
statistically significant at 1% level for pre-crisis period with 
[0, 1]
.006DM   . Thus, you 
can reject 
[0, 1]0
: 0DH     with 99% degree of confidence for 2002-2007 period. The 
result indicates that the rating downgrade announcements do carry important 
information to the market. Similar results are obtained by Dichev and Piotroski (2001), 
Nordon and Weber (2004) and Jorion and Zhang (2007) who discover significant 
negative abnormal stock returns around downgrade announcements. However, some 
researchers, e.g. Hand et al (1992) and Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) show that 
downgrades do not carry information relevant to the market agents.  
 
For post-crisis period, within the interval [0, 1]  (pair 3) the sign of CAAR and 
the mean difference of 
DM  are positive with .66CAAR   and [0; 1] .009DM   . Despite 
you can reject 0H  at 5% significance level, it shows that downgrades, during 2009-
2015, have the impact on CAAR opposite of what would you expect from negative 
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announcement (which we assume is bad news). The explanation of this result possibly 
lies in the fact that the research is conducted on German market during recovery period 
and that the market agents expect strong growth in future, despite current financial 
difficulties. There is also possibility that this is an evidence of insider trading that 
incorporates private information or the effect of rating outlooks and reviews.  
 
Figure 6 over the post-announcement window [+2, +20] shows bouncing up of 
CAAR between +2 and +7 days after the downgrade announcement with relatively 
stable movement afterwards for both pre- and post-crisis periods. In spite of the 
downgrade event, CAAR during this segment of the window are positive and equal to 
0.54 and 1.48, accordingly. The results of the paired samples test on 
[ 2, 20]D
M
 
 indicate 
1% significance level for pre-crisis, 18[ 2, 20] 4.759   , and 5% significance level for 
post-crisis, 18[ 2, 20] 9.194   . Therefore, you cannot accept [ 2, 20]0 : 0DH      that the 
mean difference between CAAR  and CANR  is zero. Similar pattern is observed by 
Richards and Deddouche (1999) and Goh and Ederington (1993).  
 
Finally, statistical comparison between abnormal returns during pre- and post-
crises for downgrades given in table 8 shows different results compared to table 5. In 
this case all four pairs are significant at 1% level. Here, signs of the means are not 
expected to be negative because comparison for pre-crisis and post-crisis samples in 
both cases is done on rating downgrades. The first interval in the window event shows 
negative mean difference between abnormal returns between pre- and post-crises 
periods. At the same time for the rest three intervals it is positive. The explanation is 
that in case of  [ 60, 21]   abnormal returns are higher for post-crisis period compared 
to the pre-crisis period and vice versa for intervals [ 20, 1], [0, 1] and [ 2,20]    . 
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Table 6 Descriptive statistics and paired samples t-test for cumulative average abnormal stock returns around rating downgrade announcements† 
Pre-crisis period (01.01.2002-01.09.2007) 
Paired Samples Test 
 
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Pair 1 Preannouncement period 1:   
Av Abnormal return - Av Normal 
return  
-0.02830 0.01594 0.00252 -0.03339 -0.02320 
-11.229** 39 .000 
Pair 2 Preannouncement period 2:  
Av Abnormal return - Av Normal 
return 
-0.01490 0.00877 0.00196 -0.01900 -0.01079 
-7.595** 19 .000 
Pair 3 Preannouncement period 3: 
 Av Abnormal return - Av 
Normal return  
-0.00640 0.00009 0.00006 -0.00719 -0.00560 
-101.879** 1 .006 
Pair 4 Preannouncement period 4: 
 Av Abnormal return - Av 
Normal return 
-0.00529 0.00485 0.00111 -0.00763 -0.00296 
-4.759** 18 .000 
† Preannouncement period 1: 40-day interval [-60; -21], Preannouncement period 2: 20-day interval [-20; -1], Preannouncement period 3: 2-day interval [0; +1], 
Preannouncement period 4: 19-day interval [+2; +20] 
Notes:    * indicates significance at 5% level,  
** indicates significance at 1% level 
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Table 7 Descriptive statistics and paired samples t-test for cumulative average abnormal stock returns around rating downgrade announcements † 
Post-crisis period (01.01.2009-01.05.2015) 
Paired Samples Test 
 
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 Preannouncement period 1:   
Av Abnormal return - Av 
Normal return  
-0.05514 0.02557 0.00404 -0.06332 -0.04696 
-13.637** 39 .000 
Pair 2 Preannouncement period 2:  
Av Abnormal return - Av 
Normal return 
0.00066 0.01403 0.00314 -0.00591 0.00722 
.209 19 .837 
Pair 3 Preannouncement period 3: 
 Av Abnormal return - Av 
Normal return  
0.00879 0.00027 0.00019 0.00638 0.01120 
46.316* 1 .014 
Pair 4 Preannouncement period 4: 
 Av Abnormal return - Av 
Normal return 
0.01523 0.00722 0.00166 0.01175 0.01871 
9.194** 18 .000 
† Preannouncement period 1: 40-day interval [-60; -21], Preannouncement period 2: 20-day interval [-20; -1], Preannouncement period 3: 2-day interval [0; +1], 
Preannouncement period 4: 19-day interval [+2; +20] 
Notes:    * indicates significance at 5% level,  
** indicates significance at 1% level  
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Table 8 Descriptive statistics and paired samples t-test for the difference between pre- and post-crisis periods for CAAR around rating downgrade 
announcements † 
Paired Samples Test 
 
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod1_pre - 
AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod1_post 
-.0188867 .0093977 .0014859 -.0218922 -.0158812 -12.711** 39 .000 
Pair 2 AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod2_pre - 
AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod2_post 
.0163572 .0084622 .0018922 .0123968 .0203177 8.644** 19 .000 
Pair 3 AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod3_pre - 
AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod3_post 
.0112466 .0002011 .0001422 .0094396 .0130536 79.081** 1 .008 
Pair 4 AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod4_pre - 
AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod4_post 
.0114710 .0034954 .0008019 .0097862 .0131557 14.305** 18 .000 
† Preannouncement period 1: 40-day interval [-60; -21], Preannouncement period 2: 20-day interval [-20; -1], Preannouncement period 3: 2-day interval [0; +1], 
Preannouncement period 4: 19-day interval [+2; +20] 
Notes:    * indicates significance at 5% level,  
** indicates significance at 1% level  
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6. Rank of average abnormal returns and rank test 
The disadvantage of the paired samples test is that it relies on normal distributional 
assumptions. Therefore, for robustness check we conduct the nonparametric rank test 
similar in spirit to Corrado (1989). Corrado employs a nonparametric rank test for 
excess performance. This test has similarities with the parametric tests. However, as 
opposed to the ordinary tests, the rank of the abnormal returns are used.  
To apply the nonparametric rank test, the rank of the abnormal returns for the analysed 
period is needed. Consider a sample of observations of abnormal returns in the event 
window. The highest rank is given to the highest abnormal return within the event 
window and vice versa for the lowest rank (Lehman, 1961). The rank test transforms the 
excess returns into a uniform distribution across ranks. Thus, in the case of the 
nonparametric rank test, one should convert the given returns into its respective ranks.   
Denoting tK  as the rank of the averaged excess return, tAAR , and with the event 
window comprising 81 days, the following definition holds: 
 
 ( ), 60,..., 20t tK rank AAR t     (14) 
 
Corrado (1989) reports that the average rank is obtained by dividing the number of 
observed returns by two. Thus, in this case the average rank is 40.5 and a proxy for the 
abnormal return is 
 ( 40.5)t tPAI K   (19) 
Where tPAI  is a proxy for the abnormal return 
The main feature of rank test consists of ranking each observation in order to bring them 
into a uniform distribution. Tests of the null hypothesis can be implemented using the 
result that the asymptotic null distribution is standard normal. The rest of the procedure 
of the test does not considerably differ from procedure for Eq. 13. 
For the sake of clarity we conducted a paired rank test on post-crisis period only. The 
results of the rank test show that statistical significance of the paired samples remains 
similar throughout all four pairs in case of rating upgrades. For instance, the mean 
difference in paired ranks and test statistics are 
[ 60, 20]
758.050DM     and 
39
[ 60, 20] 11.006    while for the mean difference of paired samples test they are 
[ 60, 20]
.004DM      and 
39
[ 60, 20] 6.338   . Test also indicates relatively similar outcomes 
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with identical level of significance for each pair within intervals [ 20, 1],  [0, 1]  and  
[ 2, 20]  .  
However, in case of downgraded ratings, rank test demonstrates a result which 
marginally differs from paired samples test. In comparison to the latter test the mean 
difference of transformed abnormal returns within the event window for all pairs are 
negative. Statistical test for significance for the first and last intervals remain 
unchanged; nonetheless, significance level for intervals [ 20, 1] and [0, 1]    altered. 
The rank test for pair 2 shows statistical significance of 1% for this window interval,  
with 
[ 20, 1]
478.800DM     and 
19
[ 20, 1] 10.054    , while paired samples test indicates no 
significance of the mean difference, 
[ 20, 1]
.0006DM     with 
19
[ 20, 1] .209   . Finally, 
according to rank test the event date does not exhibit significant difference in mean of 
abnormal returns, 
[0, 1]
130.750DM     and 
1
[ 0, 1] 4.628   , which suggest that 
influence of downgrade announcements does not have significant influence on the 
stocks of analysed companies. 
© 2017. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Table 9 Descriptive statistics and paired ranked test for cumulative average abnormal stock returns around rating upgrade announcements † 
Post-crisis period (01.01.2009-01.05.2015) 
Paired Samples Test 
 
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod1 
AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod1  
-758.050 435.614 68.8766963 -897.366 -618.733 -11.006** 39 .000 
Pair 2 AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod2 
AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod2 
-441.350 266.249 59.5351522 -565.958 -316.7415 -7.413** 19 .000 
Pair 3 AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod3 
AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod3 
-136.750 56.922 40.2500000 -648.174 374.674 -3.398 1 .182 
Pair 4 AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod4- 
AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod4 
-512.526 222.812 51.1168034 -619.918 -405.133 -10.027** 18 .000 
† Preannouncement period 1: 40-day interval [-60; -21], Preannouncement period 2: 20-day interval [-20; -1], Preannouncement period 3: 2-day interval [0; +1], 
Preannouncement period 4: 19-day interval [+2; +20] 
Notes:    * indicates significance at 5% level,  
** indicates significance at 1% level 
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Table 10 Descriptive statistics and paired ranked test for cumulative average abnormal stock returns around rating downgrade 
announcements † 
Post-crisis period (01.01.2009-01.05.2015) 
Paired Samples Test 
 
Paired Differences 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod1 
AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod1 
-644.125 408.084 64.523 -774.636 -513.613 -9.983** 39 .000 
Pair 2 AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod2 
AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod2 
-478.800 212.975 47.622 -578.475 -379.124 -10.054** 19 .000 
Pair 3 AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod3 
AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod3 
-130.750 39.951 28.250 -489.700 228.200 -4.628 1 .135 
Pair 4 AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod4 
AvAbnormalreturnPreannounce
mentperiod4 
-555.315 266.506 61.1407303 -683.767 -426.863 -9.083** 18 .000 
† Preannouncement period 1: 40-day interval [-60; -21], Preannouncement period 2: 20-day interval [-20; -1], Preannouncement period 3: 2-day interval [0; +1], 
Preannouncement period 4: 19-day interval [+2; +20] 
Notes:    * indicates significance at 5% level,  
** indicates significance at 1% level  
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7. CONCLUSION  
The result of our paper shows that changes in rating grades carry scant 
informational value for upgrades in the German market. Stock prices of analyzed 
companies do not react significantly to upgraded ratings. However, our findings show 
that downgraded ratings have impact. Nonetheless, in both cases adjustments to stock 
prices start long before the rating announcement date both for upgrades and for 
downgrades. It is consistent with Dichev and Piotroski (2001), Hand et al. (1992) and 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) who observe significant positive abnormal stock 
returns preceding rating upgrades and no market reaction afterwards. The result of our 
study also corresponds to the findings by Jorion and Zhang (2007), Nordon and Weber 
(2004), Goh and Ederington (1999), and Hand et al. (1992) in terms of the character of 
market reaction to rating downgrades. 
Our results support the inference that rating agencies sluggish in adjusting 
ratings. This suggests that the Frankfurt Stock Exchange absorbs all information related 
to a rating issuer when it becomes publicly available. The rating agencies incorporate 
this information into ratings with some time lag. Therefore, the predicting power of 
rating agencies cannot be proved for German market. However, the importance of rating 
agencies should not be neglected. The shares may adjust precisely because of 
anticipation of future rating upgrade or downgrade, after the news become available.  
The limiting factor in this paper is data. Our data mostly consists of large 
capitalized companies. Whilst it allows you to select companies that represent the most 
transparent and traded stocks, it excludes small companies. Utilising Prime All Share 
Index or CDAX Index is a better measure of the performance of the entire German 
equities market. As a final remark, the outcome of this research demonstrates that the 
market, along with anticipating the rating change, reacts stronger to downgrades 
compared to upgrades. This result confirms that adverse implications of low credit 
rating prompt the market participants to take negative rating announcements more 
seriously. 
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